Following a seven day artillery barrage that intended to decimate German defences, the Battle of the Somme began in earnest on the morning of 1 July 1916. By the end of the first day the British Expeditionary Force had suffered 57,470 casualties and a further 19,240 killed, with very little ground gained. The battle continued until 18 November 1916, and within that 141 days saw the development of the creeping barrage, the introduction of the tank to the battlefield and the gain of territory 6 miles (10km) deep by 20 miles (32km) long.

Throughout the offensive, an extensive supply chain was required. However, previously the Somme had been a quiet sector and did not have the existing logistical infrastructure to support and sustain a large offensive. Railways were the main method of supply transport from the ports to the theatre of operations. Supplies sent in bulk over the railways were sent to a regulating station, where they were sorted in ammunition trains, pack trains and engineering trains. Naturally, railways could not operate right up to the front line, and subsequent links in the supply chain became slower and smaller. What started as fast, bulk transportation on the railway lines became smaller loads in mechanised transport, until it was broken up further and carried by horse transport over broken ground towards the shellfire and bullets of the front lines.

In the weeks leading up to the battle, weekly ammunition train deliveries leapt from 5 to 90. 21,981 tons of ammunition were delivered during week 19 June to 26 June to support the great bombardment. Once the fighting commenced, the Fourth Army required 31-70 trains of general supply a day, whilst pre offensive this number had had been between 1 ¼ to 4. As this increase happens, the inadequacies of the existing supply system were exposed. BEF trains leaving the ports did not follow a timetable, and simply left when they were loaded and ready. Congestion ensued, and 18 miles of loaded trains were stuck at the Amiens railhead causing problems backwards down the chain to the regulating stations and ports, as well as critical supply shortages forward to the combat areas.

Attempting to relieve the railways, the Army dramatically increased its use of mechanical transport, such as lorries. However, the chalk roads of the region, built for local farm traffic, began to collapse under weight. The massive increase in demand for stone repairs subsequently lead to an increase in the use of railways to supply the stone… which in turn increased strain on the railway, which is what they had been trying to decrease. Without the roads repaired lorry breakdowns increased. Subsequently both road and rail got worse, whilst supply issues also meant horse forage supplies went down and every leg of the supply chain suffered.

Civilian experts were recruited to review the supply chain crisis. In the Autumn of 1916, Sir Eric Geddes, the General Manager of the North Eastern Raily, inspected the entire BEF transportation system from port to railhead. Army leadership, particularly Field Marshal Douglas Haig, were sceptical over what a civilian would know about movement and transport in war and Sir Ronald Maxwell, the Quartermaster General, threatened to resign. Unsurprisingly, Geddes declared the existing transport system not fit for purpose, highlighting a lack of light railways, a poor road system and the underutilisation of Inland Water Transport. Geddes also criticised the decentralised operations, whereby individual departments and services competed for limited space on transport and ineffectively distributed supplies. Haig backed the findings. The criticisms cut deep into the existing system, and the savage reforms were nicknamed the ‘Geddesburg’, after the bloody American Civil War battle Gettysburg.

By spring 1917 Geddes, now the Director General of Transportation, had created a centralised system that emulated civilian networks. It was, however, only suitable for the static nature of trench warfare and the limitations of this system were problematic in 1918 when the Western Front became a war of movement. Every time the front line moved forward in British favour, the whole supply system had to be rearranged. Roads and railways were extended, new supply dumps established, and new transport routes planned from the refilling points to the field units.

If a new supply system had not been devised during the Somme, any future offensives would have met the same supply issue, troops could not push forward, and the war could never have be won.

Watch the late Rob Thompson’s talk to the Western Front Association for further information on logistics during the Somme Campaign https://www.westernfrontassociation.com/world-war-i-articles/2021/october/never-mind-the-quality-feel-the-width-bef-logistics-during-the-somme-campaign/

Sam Jolley – Head Curator